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Abstract—The increasing number of Distributed Denial-of-
Service (DDoS) attacks leads to a growing research and de-
velopment interest in DDoS defense systems. As a response
to the increasingly distributed nature of DDoS attacks, many
organizations have demonstrated willingness to exchange infor-
mation concerning threats, incidents, and mitigation strategies.
Blockchain is, in this regard, a viable threat sharing platform,
where different organizations can interact in a verifiable manner.
This paper tackles the security visualization and management is-
sue in a blockchain-based collaborative defense platform, defining
an interactive dashboard displaying on-going threat mitigation
status and enabling security analysts to react on threats on an
individual or group level. The dashboard was implemented and
evaluated on real hardware emulating the exchange of threats
between three isolated Autonomous Systems (AS).
I. INTRODUCTION
As internet access becomes progressively democratic, in-
cluding not only many different people using diverse types of
stationary and portable devices, there is a concern about device
security and the awareness of personal security. In addition
to the growing number of connected devices, the increase of
available bandwidth allows these devices to exchange a larger
volume of data in support of current services and experiences,
such as online gaming and video streaming [1]. However,
negative side-effects of such a hyper-connected world can
be translated into the number of threats and attacks, which
are periodically reported by security organizations across the
world. Recent statistics on security reports show, for example,
not only a steady increase in the number of Distributed Denial-
of-Service (DDoS) attacks, but also the number of long-
duration attacks (e.g., the most extended attack was longer
than 12 days [2]).
Centralized defenses can become a bottleneck due to the
need to analyze all traffic measurements at a single location.
Thus, the distributed nature of DDoS attacks suggests that
a distributed and coordinated defense is the best alternative
for a successful defense [3]. The advantages of cooperative
defenses over traditional and centralized defenses have been
widely recognized in the literature [4], [5]. For instance,
they allow for comibing detection/mitigation capabilities of
different domains, reduce the detection/mitigation overhead at
a single point, and block malicious traffic near its source.
However, there is still no widespread deployment of such
cooperative defense systems.
In this regard, a permissioned Blockchain (BC) is a trust-
worthy, decentralized, and publicly available data storage,
effectively supporting all members of the cooperative DDoS
defence alliance. BC capabilities can be leveraged to build
a platform for signaling attacks, serving as an immutable
platform for the exchange of mitigation services defined in
Smart Contracts (SC) of different peers, but also to provide
incentives stimulating the cooperative behavior among service
providers [6], [7]. Thus, if an attack is highly sophisticated
and there are no countermeasures available, it is possible to
request for cooperative mitigation for any domain participating
in the alliance.
The major challenge, regardless of the underlying technol-
ogy, is how to visualize information in a clear and objective
manner considering the particularities of a collaborative de-
fense. Thus, it is also required to consider that specialists must
analyze not only internal threats, but also external mitigation
requests. As the first step to threat mitigation is realizing its
existence, it is critical for analysts to use a proper tool to
structure and categorize data such that visualization ”makes
sense” [8]. A collaborative defense involves multi-disciplinary
concepts, and the decision-making process usually requires a
low response time from the user, but selecting an appropriate
type of graphical representation and flow of interaction is not
a straightforward task [9].
This paper extends the work proposed in [10], presenting
a threat management dashboard for the operation of a col-
laborative defense. The design considers the basic principles
of Security Visualization applied to a collaborative defense,
in which the primary stakeholder is a cybersecurity analyst,
who can be either in the position of a Mitigator (M ) or a
Target (T ). The main functional actions within the dashboard
are defined according to the role of the organization in the
cooperative defense, which is defined as follows: (i) T can
request a mitigation or ignore an alarm, or (ii) as a M , analyzes
incoming requests being accepted or declined. Furthermore,
an analyst needs to be able to check service status and start
or stop them in a way that is straightforward to manage, for
example, from a web browser [11].
This paper is structured as follows. Section II presents re-
lated work on security visualization. Section III highlights the
requirements that guided the dashboard development. Finally,
the use-case evaluation is presented in Section IV, followed
by a summary in Section V.
II. RELATED WORK
A wide range of visualization techniques have been applied
in support of network security analytics. Visualization aims
at converting collected data into useful information support-
ing the activities of a cybersecurity analyst [12]. However,
techniques have been adapted from traditional network perfor-
mance and health approaches to security, which are typically
not adequately tested concerning their utility or usability
providing a Situation Awareness (SA) to security analysts
about vulnerabilities and threats [13].
There are different challenges to reach SA: (a) being critical
to identify and (b) to model the relevant activities of interest.
According to [11], SA can be achieved by recognizing the
(i) current situation and acknowledging that an attack occurs,
measuring the (ii) the impact of an attack, and the awareness
of (iii) its evolution by tracking the situation. According to
[14], various factors are to be considered upon designing
dashboards, being critical not to overload the dashboard with
visual features, and to make prominent visual features to show
important messages.
[15] defines the following method: (i) overview first, (ii)
zoom and filter, then (iii) provide details-on-demand. First, it
is necessary to grasp the situation and its possible outcomes to
receive an overview, e.g., analyzes a DDoS attack to determine
whether it is necessary to request or accept/deny a cooperative
defense. Furthermore, zoom and filter related to the detailed
analysis of the specific event, i.e., the filtering of unrelated
events that can introduce unwanted noise into the analysis.
Finally, further details (iii) can be provided on demand to the
analyst.
Tools to visualize DDoS attacks vary from representations
for non-technical audiences [16] to visualizations designed
explicitly for cybersecurity analysts. While the former is
related to the design of infographics and charts for a business
audience, the latter aims at analyzing detailed attack data
and transforming the data into a visual format optimized for
cybersecurity analysts [17], [18]. Although there is not a one-
size-fits-all visualization tool due to the subjective nature of
the human perception process, research in visualization either
leads to adapting existing visualization techniques to the cy-
bersecurity or leading to novel ways to visualize cybersecurity
data.
Furthermore, dashboards are commonly used to analyze data
in (near) real-time. The focus is to understand the current state
of a system concerning ongoing tasks or events of interest. [14]
describes factors to consider during the design of dashboards,
such as (i) overloading the dashboard with visual features, (b)
to make prominent visual features to show essential messages,
and (iii) design a dashboard within constraints, even though
they still should be simple to view. Further, there should not be
unnecessary decorations, or overused colors and other visual
properties. Also, it is essential to note that event visualization
is very much based on human perception, and as discussed
in [15], it is important to keep the initial dashboard simple to
provide details and metrics on demand.
III. DASHBOARD
The goal of a collaborative defense is to be complementary
with in-house defense mechanisms. Thus, the dashboard (cf.
Figures 4 and 5 in the evaluation) is concerned with events
and components related to information, such as the status of
relevant services and individual attack reports submitted to the
BC.
An AS can be in the role of a M or T, so both tabs are
available to the network operator. These tabs display three
columns based on a progressive state scheme (i.e., it is possible
to monitor the state of a mitigation service during its different
stages) from left to right, in which the left lane is dedicated
to new events [19]. The middle lane contains all events in
progress and updates them accordingly to changes in their
status. The right lane represents a log of all finished or declined
elements. In more detail, the REQUESTS TAB contains all
incoming mitigation requests. The ALARMS TAB contains
all alarms triggered as soon as a pre-defined inbound traffic
threshold is breached. In more detail, the REQUESTS TAB
contains all incoming mitigation requests.
Also, combining meaningful naming and appropriate col-
oring of states enhances the user experience for the security
analyst. Therefore, it is crucial to standardize the use of colors
in security visualization [20] to enhance rapid information
processing. A classic example in this regard is the use of
red for signaling events that require an action whereas yellow
is typically used for signaling events that require attention.
Colors were selected according to their meaning in the process
context. For incoming mitigation requests, for example, state
identifiers start with MITIGATION_REQ_*, and for outgoing
requests for mitigation start with REQ_MITIGATION_*. In
the following listing, ? stands for both, incoming and outgoing
mitigation requests.
1) States in red hues highlight highest importance and
primary priority to the analyst, hence it is used to display
a NEW_ALARM because they should be processed as soon
as possible. Hence, if the target AS analyst decides to
request help, REQ_MITIGATION_REQUESTED still
needs to be monitored closely since the reaction of the
mitigator AS has to be waited for.
2) States in yellow hues indicate a primary priority, but
not as urgent as states in red, since the mitiga-
tor is not the target, but the origin of an attack.
NEW_MITIGATION_REQUEST elements are displayed
in the brightest yellow hue. Further, the states
?_ACCEPTED and ?_IN_PROGRESS are also yellow
since they need monitoring and are not finished yet.
Errors could still occur.
3) States in green and grey hues are secondary prior-
ity since they do not need any user interaction and
were both already inspected by the analyst. Therefore,
?_SUCCESSFUL and ?_DECLINED do not draw
immediate user attention with their coloring.
Figures 1 and 2 depict the state machines for both T ’s and
M ’s perspective.
Fig. 1: State Diagram to Request Mitigation.
1) Alarms Tab - Target Interaction Flow: The start of the
state diagram is triggered by a DDoS attack by nodes from
other networks, operated by other ASes. In short, the AS of
the attacked target will issue an attack report to the BC, which
in turn will be retrieved by the AS of the attacking nodes,
henceforth called Mitigator (M ).
First, a network monitoring system sends traffic data to
BloSS, which determines whether the pre-defined traffic
thresholds are breached or not. For each breach, an attack
report is sent to the BC and persisted with an initial status of
NEW_ALARM if the same attack report hash has not been
persisted yet.
The lifecycle of an attack report starts with the state
NEW_ALARM as soon as a traffic breach occurs. The analyst
of the target AS has to decide whether the attack should be re-
ported or not (hence ignored). If the analyst ignores the alarm,
the attack report changes state to ALARM_IGNORED and the
lifecycle of the attack report ends. Otherwise, it is possible to
request the cooperative mitigation and the state changes to
REQUEST_MITIGATION_REQUESTED. This means that the
attack report is submitted to the BC and retrieved by the miti-
gator ASes. It is important to note that at this point, an attack
report with the state of NEW_MITIGATION_REQUEST is
created on the mitigator’s side (as soon as it was retrieved
from the BC), hence starting the state machine in Figure 2.
Further, the mitigator decides whether or not to accept the
request for mitigation. If the request is declined, the state
changes to REQ_MITIGATION_DECLINED and the lifecy-
cle of the attack report ends. Otherwise, the state changes to
REQ_MITIGATION_ACCEPTED, meaning that the mitigator
AS will block any harmful traffic. Now the states are congruent
with the states of the mitigator (cf. Figure 2).
Fig. 2: State Diagram to Decide on Mitigation Requests.
Therefore, from the moment that the mitigator
starts blocking traffic, the state changes to
REQ_MITIGATION_IN_PROGRESS. After the blocking
time expires, the mitigation successfully ends, and the
lifecycle of the attack report changes to the state of
REQ_MITIGATION_SUCCESSFUL. Then, the AS of the
attackers’ origin will retrieve the attack reports and decide
whether or not to accept the requests. From here on out, the
process from the target’s perspective is finished.
A. Requests Tab - Mitigator Interaction Flow
An AS with the role of mitigator periodically checks for
attacks signaled i.e., reported on its SC. For example, when
an AS is under attack, it can report the attackers directly on
the SC of ASes that are responsible for the networks, from
where the identified hosts originated. In this regard, BloSS
instances are configured to periodically check for changes in
the states of their Smart Contracts, i.e., whether there are
requests, and further creating events on the dashboard and
updating whenever their status is changed. As soon as an
attack report is reported and retrieved via IPFS, it is persisted
in BloSS and displayed in the dashboard with an initial status
of NEW_MITIGATION_REQUEST if the same attack report
hash has not been persisted yet.
The analyst on the mitigator M side has to decide whether
the mitigation should be accepted. If the analyst declines, e.g.,
provided incentives are not attractive, or the AS is unavailable
to perform the requested mitigation; the attack report state is
modified to MITIGATION_REQ_DECLINED and the life-
cycle of the attack report ends. Otherwise, the state changes to
an intermediary state of MITIGATION_REQ_ACCEPTED.
As soon as the AS performs the requested mitigation, traffic
of reported attackers (hence mitigating the attack), the state
changes to MITIGATION_REQ_IN_PROGRESS. When the
mitigation is confirmed and relayed to the dashboard, the mit-
igation successfully ends and the lifecycle of the attack report
changes to the state of MITIGATION_REQ_SUCCESSFUL.
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(a) Schematic Representation (b) BloSS Hardware
Fig. 3: BloSS schematic view and hardware prototype
IV. USE CASE EVALUATION
The dashboard was deployed on a physical single board
computer cluster (cf. Figure 3). Hardware and configuration
details are presented in Subsecions IV-A and IV-B, and Use
cases UC1 and UC2 on IV-D and IV-E, respectively.
A. Hardware
Three isolated and identically configured ASes were built:
AS 400, AS 500, and AS 600 with each AS consisting of
four host nodes used to initiate the attack traffic, and two
controllers, which host the BloSS as well as the Ethereum BC
and IPFS [21] nodes. Hosts are based on Raspberry Pi Model
B (RPi) and controllers use ASUS Tinker Board devices,
which provide greater computational capacity than RPIs.
B. Configuration
The schematic representation (cf. Figure 3) (a) shows the
network setup in the BloSS hardware (b). The management
network is configured via wireless between the three routers,
the two auxiliary controllers, and the gateway. Furthermore,
additional MikroTik routers and switches are necessary since
the Zodiac FX switches only provide four ports, which is not
sufficient to connect all hosts of an AS. The SDN controller
responsible for the Zodiac FX switches is directly specified in
the Zodiac FX Web interface.
C. Evaluation Scenario
Hosts connected to AS 400 (4 hosts), AS 500 (4 hosts) and
AS 600 (three hosts) will start a flood-based DDoS attack on a
single host on AS 600. Controllers of all ASes are configured
with a static inbound traffic threshold to determine whether
there is an ongoing attack. Based on this, alarms on the AS
400 dashboard will show a warning about the attack and the
operator can decide to request the cooperative mitigation or
the ignore alarm (UC1). Then, if cooperative mitigation is
requested, the dashboard on AS 600 will display the mitigation
request (UC2).
D. UC1 - Request Mitigation or Ignore Alarm
The precondition for UC1 is that all the BLoSS services are
active and operating correctly (cf. Figure 4). In this regard, the
left-hand side of the dashboard shows the interface (BloSS AS
400) that presents the status of services, which can have its
services activated or deactivated modules based on a click.
In the first step, as soon as the inbound traffic breaches
the pre-defined threshold (i.e., a DDoS attack is detected),
alarms are sent to the dashboard, and the operator has to
decide on whether to request or ignore these alarms. Then, the
dashboard displays a message NEW_ALARM, which is seen
in the Requests column in Figure 4, and the security analyst
can decide on whether to request for collaborative defense or
ignore the alarm.
In the following, the security analyst should decide whether
to request the cooperative mitigation or ignore the alarm. If
a mitigation is required, a request is sent to BloSS, which
submits a transaction to the BC and the request is moved
to the column ”In Progress” on the dashboard with status
REQUEST_MITIGATION_REQUESTED. Then, the target
operators on AS 500 and AS 600 can either decline the request
for mitigation and the status of the attack report changes to
REQ_MITIGATION_DECLINED or accept the request for
mitigation and the status of the attack report changes to
REQ_MITIGATION_ACCEPTED.
As soon as the involved mitigator involved starts block-
ing, i.e., applying a mitigation action such as blackhol-
ing traffic or blocking hosts listed as attackers, the at-
tack report is also REQ MITIGATION IN PROGRESS.
After the expiration of the maximum block duration, the
attack report is completed, and thus, ends in the status
REQ_MITIGATION_SUCCESSFUL. The history of requests,
besides being registered in the BC (not disclosing the details,
e.g., blacklisted addresses), is available to all members of the
alliance. The events involving each domain are also registered
and grouped in the ”Log” column and can have their details
visualized on demand.
Fig. 4: bloss-dashboard UI running on AS 400 with all possible states of an example attack report in the ALARMS_TAB
E. UC2 - Accept or Decline Mitigation Request
This use case, in contrast to UC1, considers the mitigator’s
perspective available in the ”Requests” tab (cf. Figure 5).
Mitigation requests are periodically retrieved from the BC,
which are relayed to bloss-dashboard to display to the
operator with the status NEW_MITIGATION_REQUEST.
Incoming requests can be grouped depending on the number
of requests and the operator can click on specific events for
more details.
At this point, an operator can decide to deny the
request (and the attack report’s status changes to
MITIGATION_REQ_DECLINED), or to accept the
request (and the attack report’s status changes to
MITIGATION_REQ_ACCEPTED). Once requests are
accepted or denied, the dashboard forwards the request to
BloSS, which submits the transaction to the BC. Then, the
mitigation service has a deadline to be completed, which can
be visualized in the time stamps registered on the dashboard.
This service deadline is required for the mitigator to upload a
proof of completion of the requested mitigation task, ensuring
the effectiveness of a cooperative mitigation service.
Traffic from attacking hosts is mitigated, the attack report’s
status changes to MITIGATION_REQ_IN_PROGRESS. At
this point, the mitigator can act rationally and upload a proof
or miss the upload. However, it is not possible to verify the
truthfulness or the quality of the (proof of) service performed
by M (issue discussed in [22]). Even if the BC can preserve a
transparent audit trail for all transactions, it cannot compensate
for lack of ground-truth. This holds for the uploaded proof
of service, as well as for user-defined, subjective ratings, in
which there is no automated way to determine the truthfulness
of proof or rating fully.
Once the service is completed, and the proof is uploaded
(e.g., log showing a mitigation action), or the mitigation
deadline is expired, the service is considered complete, and the
status is changed to MITIGATION_REQ_SUCCESSFUL.
Similarly to UC1, all mitigation service events involving each
domain are registered and grouped in the ”Log” column, and
its details can be visualized on demand. The transparency of
actions recorded in the BC as well as their details locally on
the requester and the mitigation on logs is useful in cases
where a mitigation service does not have its effectiveness
proven by the uploaded proof.
V. CONSIDERATIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Visualizing and classifying cybersecurity events is not a
straightforward task. A cooperative defense adds a layer
of complexity, in which not only should internal threats
be analyzed and classified, but also threats of cooperative
ASes. This paper presented a threat management dashboard
providing a simple and objective interface for cybersecurity
analysts. The dashboard allows for managing both incoming
mitigation requests and requests for mitigation service, with
the ability being possible to follow their progress in near real-
time. Further, this paper complements the original architecture
of BloSS, which is based on a permissioned BC with a
Proof-of-Authority consensus, enabling the visualization and
management of cooperative defense requests in a dashboard.
While command line interfaces provide greater agility and
efficiency in the use of resources, a dashboard provides the
operator an efficient situational analysis through its visual
intuitiveness and the use of graphic elements. Hence, reaction
speed is not an element as important as situational awareness,
which favors the use of dashboards the context of security.
Future work includes improvements on the configuration
tab to offer additional configuration possibilities e.g., changing
traffic-thresholds, the maximum number of alarms, mitigation
requests to be visualized, and other parameters directly from
Fig. 5: bloss-dashboard UI running on AS 600 with all possible states of an example attack report in the REQUESTS_TAB
the UI. Also, additional implementation should provide de-
tailed insights into the reputation history of members involved
in mitigation services.
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